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Summary
Trade restrictions stemming from the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
have created a situation in which rare and attractive
bird species command high prices on international pet
markets. Most of these species are of tropical or
subtropical origin, and many are amenable to captive
breeding. Hence, the possibility of exporting birds
under CITES provisions for the export of captive-
raised animals is under debate in many countries
around the world. If export bans are replaced by
systems of export permits, the economics of avicul-
tural markets will govern the magnitude, timing, and
nature of the impacts of the bird trade. Avicultural
economics, however, is little studied, and the long-term
economic viabilities of exotic pet markets are poorly
understood. In order to elucidate these, a dynamic
model of an avicultural market was constructed, based
on descriptive information. Model simulations showed
that the high prices commanded by sought-after bird
species tended to bring about oversupply and rapid
price decline. Short-lived, fecund species produced a
rapid, sharp pulse of oversupply; longer-lived species
produced more persistent but less acute conditions of
oversupply. The present high prices for protected bird
species may be regarded as a potential source of wind-
fall profits, or as a factor that might be manipulated to
discourage the poaching and smuggling of wild birds. If
export-oriented aviculture is considered as a compo-
nent of strategies for diversification of agriculture and
promotion of sustainable development, it is important
that decision-makers factor in the likelihood of signifi-
cant declines in bird prices and that they consider the
risk of accidental species introductions that is inherent
in holding large exotic-bird populations.
Keywords: exotic pet, market, aviculture, model, economic
risk
Introduction
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES) has protected many charismatic bird
species from international trade. These species often
command high prices in the pet trade away from their land of
origin. For example, a galah (Cacatua roseicapilla) selling for
US$ 20–60 in Australia (A$ 35–100; A$ 1  US$ 0.60, July
2000) might sell for 20 to100 times as much on international
markets.
CITES does not entirely ban commercial trade in plants
and animals that it lists as threatened with extinction (listed in
Appendix I of the CITES convention) or potentially threat-
ened with extinction (listed in Appendix II of the CITES
Convention). It does, however, place stringent controls on the
export of listed animals (Wijnstekers 2000). CITES restric-
tions have been amplified by national laws in many nations
(Favre 1989), including outright bans on commercial wildlife
export in countries such as Australia and Brazil. Counter-
pressure is mounting in many parts of the world. In Australia,
for example, there has been considerable discussion of legal-
izing the controlled export of native bird species.
What sort of a market might result from widespread
commercial production of protected bird species for inter-
national pet markets? Is it, as some advocate (RRA&T 1998),
a potential source of extra income for struggling rural and
regional economies? Or might activities that are ecologically
sustainable prove economically fragile?
Little has been published on the economics of the bird
trade. The flow of threatened and endangered bird species
from the wild into pet markets has been studied widely in
conjunction with CITES (Roet et al. 1980; Roet & Milliken
1985; Thomsen & Brautigam 1991). Such studies tend to be
bird-centred, and rarely provide information on the econ-
omic actors and their behaviour.
Although data are scarce, the attributes of bird markets are
sufficiently well known to support qualitative description of
system behaviour and heuristic modelling. In the Australian
( J.M. Robinson, personal observation) and African (M.
Perrin, personal communication, August 2000) cases, salient
system features include the following four.
(1) Markets with low barriers to entry and strong partici-
pation of informal producers. For many breeders, raising
birds is a hobby that brings in a few dollars and occasion-
ally pays for itself. Backyard aviaries are numerous, and
the line between the producer and the consumer is fuzzy.
(2) Strong market differentiation. In Australia, at least 70
native parrot species and an additional 50 exotic parrot
species are traded (Parrot Society of Australia Inc.
1999a); in South Africa, around 20 African parrot species
and 50 exotic species are traded. (M. Perrin, personal
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communication 2000). Prices range from around US$ 5
for common species (for example ‘budgies’, Melopsittacus
undulatus, and peach-faced lovebirds, Agapornis rose-
icollis) to figures in excess of US$ 10 000 for rare and
spectacular species of cockatoo in Africa and macaw in
both Africa and Australia (Parrot Society of Australia Inc.
1999a; M. Perrin, personal communication, August
2000). The difficulty of keeping spans a similar range.
Budgies and lovebirds are easily kept as house pets,
survive on a diet of birdseed and simple supplements, and
given a small aviary, nesting boxes, and two or more pairs
of birds, reproduce prolifically. Untrained, parent-raised
birds are popular and relatively trouble-free pets. Large
macaws and cockatoos, at the other extreme, are notorious
shriekers, vigorous chewers, and demand lots of attention
(Giannini 1993). For proper socialization, they require
careful hand feeding for many months. If not properly
socialized and cared for, they tend to develop behaviours
such as screaming, biting, and obsessive begging that
make them very poor companions (Wilson 1998).
(3) Small niche markets, especially for expensive and diffi-
cult to keep species. According to data from the 1998
Australian National Exotic Bird Registration Scheme,
there were 640 macaws of 10 species registered in
Australia (Parrot Society of Australia Inc. 1999b; Table
1). On average (calculated from data in Table 1), each
bird holder had just over three birds of the same species.
(4) Supply and demand are modulated by population
dynamics. For species that take years to reach sexual
maturity, breeding up in response to increased demand
may take several years. Demand is easily satiated,
because, barring disease, accidents and euthanasia, pet
birds are what economists call ‘durable’. The potential
life span of a large parrot is similar to that of a human
being (Wilson 1998), and medium-sized parrots can
survive for a few decades (Clubb 1998).
Scattered data are available on birds as pets. For example,
a 1998 survey found that around 17% of Australian house-
holds kept one or more pet birds (PIAS 1998). The equivalent
figure for the USA in 1996–7 was around 8% (AVMA 1997).
It is thought that the number of captive birds in the USA is
growing by around 5% per year (Meyers 1998). In Australia,
the National Exotic Bird Registration Scheme (1998)
provides information on the captive populations of many
exotic species, but because the earliest data available are from
1997, the data are of limited value for studying trends. In
general, demographic data on pet birds are very difficult to
obtain (Clubb 1998), as are data on the amount of time for
which birds of various species are held as pets and the rates at
which they are released to the wild, put into rescue shelters,
or die prematurely through neglect, abuse, or euthanasia.
Likewise, data on factors such as price elasticity of demand for
bird purchases, cross-price elasticities between species, and
market response to external events, are virtually non-existent.
This paper describes AviMod, a heuristic model built to
explore the potential economic outcomes of recommencing
trade in aviary-raised stock for species that are presently
withheld from international trade under the CITES conven-
tion. It should be emphasized that AviMod is a conceptual
model, constructed to yield better understanding of the
dynamic features of avicultural markets. It recognizes only
one bird species and makes no attempt to model changes in
consumer preference or substitution effects.
Method
The model
AviMod was constructed in Stella II version 2.2.1 (Richmond
& Peterson 1992). An equation listing is provided in
Appendix 1. AviMod resembles other system-dynamics live-
stock models (for example Meadows 1970; Picardi 1975), in
that it tracks livestock demographic processes and relates the
supply of livestock to the breeding population, reproductive
success, and the environment. It resembles Picardi’s (1975)
Sahel model in that livestock are kept to satisfy social needs;
in this case, the need was that of animal lovers for companion
animals. It resembles Meadows’ (1970) commodity cycle
model (a nonlinear, finite-difference ‘cobweb model’; Baumol
1959) in that a population of animals is used for commercial
breeding, and herd (or flock) management is modulated by
prices. It differs from the Meadows (1970) and other cobweb-
Table 1 Macaws registered with the Australian National Exotic Bird Registration Scheme as of March 1998 (National Exotic
Bird Registration Scheme 1998) and prices for the listed species (Parrot Society of Australia Inc. 1999a).
Species Common name Number of birds Number of holders Price (A$ per pair/young bird)
Ara ambigua Great green macaw 4 1 unlisted
Ara araruana Blue and gold macaw 301 120 17000/6500
Ara auricollis Yellow-collared macaw 14 3 unlisted
Ara chloropterus Green-winged macaw 81 30 25000/10000
Ara macao Scarlet macaw 125 44 25000/10000
Ara manilata Red-bellied macaw 6 1 unlisted
Ara maracana Blue-winged macaw 12 3 unlisted
Ara nobilis Red-shouldered macaw 73 16 unlisted
Ara rubrogenus Red-fronted macaw 11 4 unlisted
Ara severa Chestnut-fronted macaw 11 4 unlisted
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type models in that consumers keep the ‘product’ (pet birds)
for years rather than consuming it. It differs from both
Meadows (1970) and Picardi (1975) in that animals move
between reproducing (commercial) and non-reproducing
(pet) populations, depending on price.
Population dynamics
AviMod includes five state variables, namely young birds
held by aviculturalists (chicks), young pets, breeding birds
(breeders), mature pets, and old birds. The biological side of
the model tracks egg laying by breeders, growth of chicks to
breeding age, growth of breeders to old age, and mortality of
birds of all ages. It is assumed that pets do not breed, and that
birds that survive past reproductive age satisfy the demand of
bird lovers for pets (in effect, their presence dampens the
market). In practice, little is known about the fate of post-
reproductive birds in aviculture (Clubb 1998). The
assumption made here is based on personal observation, but
may not pertain where aviculture is highly commercialized.
In AviMod, the numbers of post-reproductive birds are
generally small, and this assumption has little effect on model
outcomes. Time to maturity, clutch size, and mortality rates
are specified externally, and may be altered to describe
different species. High prices increase the fraction of eggs
that hatch and mature, thus providing a representation of the
effects of artificial incubation and other measures to increase
reproductive rates.
Both chicks and breeders may be sold to the pet market.
The quantities that are sold depend on price. Chicks are more
likely to be sold than breeders. If prices are high, pets may be
returned to the breeding pool.
The system’s temporal behaviour is governed by one posi-
tive feedback loop. More breeding birds lay more eggs, which
hatch to produce more breeders. This is restrained by several
negative feedback loops (Fig. 1). Supply response to demand
is delayed by the time it takes for a chick to reach breeding
age.
Demand side and price
The number of bird lovers is specified outside the model, and
may be varied to look at growing or shrinking demand, or
increased stepwise to look at the opening of new markets.
Demand is assumed to be proportional to the fraction of bird
lovers who do not have birds.
Price is a function of how well the available supply of
chicks covers the unsatisfied demand for pet birds or the
extent to which the number of birds held exceeds demand
(functional form shown in Fig. 2a). Prices are in arbitrary
units, scaled in such a way that aviculturalists reduce their
breeding stock and cut production when price falls below one.
Supply feedback
If prices are high, producers respond in three ways:
(1) Investing to ensure that a high fraction of the eggs laid
hatch into chicks, for example, through use of inubators,
and in the model this is accomplished through a price
multiplier on breeding (Fig. 2b);
(2) Bringing birds from the pet pool into breeding (this
could represent either purchase of pets by commercial
interests, or hobbyists going commercial), in other
words, price pull (Fig. 2c); and
(3) Retaining chicks to be used as breeders, in other words,
juvenile fraction sold (Fig. 2e).
Conversely, if prices are low, breeding birds enter the pet
population (price push in Fig. 2d), fewer chicks are hatched
per breeding pair, and few chicks are retained for breeding
purposes.
Scenarios
Many model parameters can be altered to study system sensi-
tivity. As a base set of scenarios, I parameterized AviMod to
represent three demographic types, namely (1) a budgie-like
species of short-lived, fecund bird, (2) a population of birds,
such as the medium-sized parrots, with medium life spans
and fecundity, and (3) a population of slow-maturing birds
with low reproductive rates, representative of cockatoos or
macaws (Table 2). Each bird population was assumed to have
a target market of 10 000 bird-lovers, each aiming for one
bird. All simulations began with a breeding bird population
of 1000 birds and an initial number of chicks equal to the
number of breeding birds multiplied by the clutch size
divided by three, in other words, 333 times the clutch size.
Initial values of pets and old birds were set to zero.
Several variations on this base model were tried, all
parameterized for Type 2 (the medium-life span group in
Table 2) demography. First, a one-year exponential lag
(SMOOTH3) was introduced in the relationship between





























Figure 1 AviMod’s main feedback loops.
Table 2 Demographic types considered in model scenarios.
Attribute Type
1 2 3
Clutch size 8 4 1
Fertile lifespan (yr) 5 12 30
Time to mature (yr) 0.5 2 5
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that producers make their breeding decisions based on the
previous year’s prices. Second, transfers between pets and
breeders were set to zero, representing a situation that is
likely to come about in an environment where breeding is
highly regulated, or where sales are made to customers in
environments where breeding is difficult. Third, to gain
insight into the possible effects of removing export restric-
tions, the consequences of a ten-fold expansion in the
number of bird lovers was considered.
After a first round of model testing, inquiries were made
over internet newsgroups to determine whether the tendency
to oversupply was an observed phenomenon. This turned up
reports that bird sanctuaries are growing explosively in the
USA, echoing the rapid growth of parrot ownership through
the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the Director of the Oasis
Sanctuary Foundation wrote (S. Erden, personal communi-
cation March 2000): ‘We are literally being flooded with
throw-away birds.’ Bird sanctuaries include many common
species, such as cockatiels, but also endangered species such
as Moluccan cockatoos.
To study the dynamics of unwanted pet birds, I created a
structural variant in which a portion of the mature and old
bird populations was transferred to bird sanctuaries, and
looked at the growth of sanctuary populations, where ‘sanc-
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Figure 2 Functional relationships assumed in AviMod as
piece-wise linear functions. Prices are scaled such that
producers break even at a price of one. All other variables are
unit-less multipliers: (a) response of price to fraction of
demand covered, (b) fractional elasticity of bird breeding to
price, (c) price elasticity factor for sales of pets into the
breeding pool, (d) price elasticity of transfer of breeders to




AviMod’s structure makes it highly price-responsive.
However, particularly for Type 3 species, it takes years for
producer decisions to affect supply. If the model is run from
an initial state with a large, unmet demand for pets, the
populations of breeders and pets begins to expand rapidly
(Fig. 3). After a few bird generations, prices fall rapidly. In
the low-price environment, breeding birds are sold to the pet
trade. As populations age, death rates rise, and eventually
the rate at which birds die exceeds the rate at which eggs
hatch. Thus both pet and breeder populations decline. This
leads to a modest rebound in prices around year 20 which
sets off a new, relatively weak demographic wave. By year
50, prices have stabilized at a level that stimulates the
breeding of enough birds to replace the birds that die, but no
more.
Demographic types
Altering demographic parameters changes the amplitude and
timing of market swings, but does not change the underlying
behaviour (Fig. 4). Type 1 (budgie type, Table 2) breeds
rapidly, and overshoots demand. Excess supply brings prices
down to the range that begins to force producers out of
production in the first three years of simulation. The conver-
sion of breeding birds to pets, and retention of few chicks for
breeding, reduces bird populations and prices rise slightly.
This sets off a second, less intense round of expansion, over-
production, and price decline, which in turn leads to a very
muted demographic ripple.
Type 3 (Table 2) takes almost two decades to meet
demand. Hence prices stay higher for longer; there is more
tendency to bring pets into the breeder population and less
tendency to sell off breeders as pets, and demographic ripples
are quite mild. The Type 2 (Table 2) population is interme-
diate between Types 1 and 2 in amplitude and timing.
Delayed price information
AviMod’s structure implicitly assumes that aviculturalists
make breeding decisions based on current price information.
This may not happen, either because price information
trickles back to producers, or because they are locked into
decisions made in a previous season. The model structure
was changed so that breeding decisions were based on the
previous year’s prices. This change made the price oscillate
along with demographic parameters and increased the ampli-
tude of oscillations in bird numbers (Fig. 5).
Natives versus exotics
If commercial aviculture is to be thought of as an export
industry, a decision must be made about whether to raise
native or exotic species. Where native species are raised, for
example cockatoo species in Australia or macaw species in
Brazil, there is a reserve of captive birds that can be called
into breeding if demand is strong. Where exotic species are
raised, say conures in Australia or cockatoos in Africa, this
buffer is not available.
The tradeoff between breeding of native versus exotic
species can be studied in AviMod by changing the rates of
flow between the pet pool and the breeding pool and by
altering the numbers of birds initially held as pets. In general
(not shown), simulations showed that the model is sensitive
to the initial number of birds in the system. If aviculturalists
start out with a breeding stock that makes them able to serve
20% instead of 10% of market demand, prices stay relatively
low, high prices persist for less time, and the peak of over-
supply is lower. If simulation starts out with a large supply of
pet birds that can be called into breeding and model parame-
terization allows substantial movement of pets into the
breeding pool, the effect is much the same as if the model is
initialized with large breeding stocks; prices are damped and
supply overshoot is less severe. Stopping the sale of breeders
to the pet trade, on the other hand, has little effect on system
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Figure 3 Fifty-year run of base-case scenario with a species with a clutch size of four, that takes two years to reach sexual
maturity and has a fertile life span of 12 years (Type 2 in Table 2). (a) Summary statistics, and (b) disaggregated by population
group.
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behaviour, so long as breeders reduce their production of
chicks when prices are low.
Opening of new markets
In Australia, and presumably other tropical countries, the
most interesting avicultural opportunity comes from devel-
opment of breeding programmes that conform to CITES
requirements, and the relaxation of bans on the export trade.
This scenario was approximated in AviMod by expanding the
population of bird lovers step-wise, from 10 000 to 100 000,
with the full increase coming in one time step. The model was
run for 50 years prior to the increase, by which time it had
come to an equilibrium state. The sudden increase in demand
leads to sky-rocketing prices and to breedering birds laying at
near full capacity (Fig. 6). The pulse, however, is short-lived.
It takes less than a decade for supply to catch up with demand
and bring prices down to the break-even point.
Time (yr)



























































































































Figure 4 Comparison of performances of different
demographic types over 25 years of simulation. Curve
numbers correspond to demographic types with long (Type
1), short (Type 3), and intermediate (Type 2) life spans, as
given in Table 2, for (a) price (fictitious units), (b) all birds,
(c) breeding birds, (d) transfer of breeders to the pet pool,




























Figure 5 The effect of breeding decisions being based on the
previous year’s prices. The model was parameterized for a
Type 2 species (medium fecundity and intermediate life span).
Abandonment and rescue
To explore the dynamics of bird surpluses and the implica-
tions for abandonment and rescue, it was assumed that, on
average, birds were kept as pets for 10 years, and then turned
over to a shelter. Short-lived (Type 1) species are the first to
start flooding shelters, but ultimately, the longer-lived birds
(Types 2 and 3), the life spans of which often exceed their
owners’ interest (or life span), pose a greater problem from
the perspective of overpopulation and humane treatment of
homeless animals (Fig. 7).
Discussion
Caveats
AviMod is a structural cartoon that greatly simplifies a
complex reality. There are several places where simplifying
assumptions are likely to influence outcomes. First, the
model simply seeks an equilibrium price, and does not
provide realistic accounting for costs and profits. AviMod’s
results do not exclude the possibility that equilibrium prices
for healthy, well-socialized young birds reflect the value
added by careful breeding, hand-feeding, and training. Thus,
even ‘low’ prices may provide employment opportunities in
developing countries. Nor does it exclude the possibility that
producers can perpetuate the windfall of novelty markets by
shifting from species to species and pulling out when the
market shows signs of turning downward.
Second, start-up questions are ignored. Establishing a
commercial breeding operation for a new species requires the
finding of productive breeding stock, the perfection of nutri-
tional and breeding and chick-rearing techniques, and the
development of marketing capability. This is likely to be a
gradual process taking many years. Hence, a regime of low
supply and high prices may persist for a much longer time
than indicated in the model, and early market entrants, who
come into production while prices remain high, may reap
much greater gains than late market entrants.
Third, model structure does not adequately differentiate
between styles of production. Little has been published on
the structures of the organizations that produce pet birds.
These range from well-capitalized operations with much
experience working with complex markets and government
regulations, to rural producers who have suffered from low
commodity prices and consider aviculture as a possible means
of diversifying production; to hobbyists whose sell a few
birds on the side to cover some of the costs of their hobby.
Different types of producer are likely to fare differently in
international pet markets, and measures to assist small
producers may affect distributional outcomes.
Economic implications
Results from AviMod suggest that if there are no serious
impediments to entry into avicultural industries, the market































Figure 6 Consequences of an expansion of the market from
10 000 to 100 000 bird lovers. Model was run for 50 years
and then market was expanded step-wise and run for an
additional 40 years. Only the last 50 years of simulation is
shown.



















































Figure 7 AviMod with 10% of mature pets and old birds
being put in rescue each year. Numbers on curves consistent
with demographic types given in Table 2. (a) Numbers of
birds in rescue shelters, and (b) comparison of the
populations of breeding birds with (grey) and without
(black) rescue.
position of oversupply and probable losses, leading to an equi-
librium position with low profit margins. The severity of the
oversupply and losses is likely to be much greater for fecund,
short-lived species; the duration of healthy profits is likely to
be longer for species with small broods and long life spans.
The inherent problem is system structure; demography
delays the producers’ response to price. The interaction
between formal and informal producers may affect the way
the problem develops, but does not affect the root problem.
Boom and bust dynamics have been observed for many
species and locations. For example, use of captive breeding to
deliberately reduce the market price for Naretha Blue
Bonnets (Psephotus haematogaster narethae) in Australia
achieved greater than a 50% price reduction in three years
(Mawson 1999). In the USA in the early 1990s, the wholesale
price for a blue and gold macaw (Ara araruana) was around
US$ 2000; in 2000, the same bird would cost US$ 500–650.
African grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) have, likewise, fallen
from US$ 1800 to US$ 650 (S. Erden, personal communi-
cation March 2000).
Market expansion, for example through relaxation of
CITES-related trade bans, only postpones oversupply. A
larger market does, however, result in more production, and
thus more total profit when the market is good, and greater
losses when the market is glutted. It also yields more surplus
birds. From a conservation (or animal rights) perspective,
these surpluses are a major concern, as they represent birds
that are most likely to escape or be released to the wild, or to
be abused or euthanized in captivity. Anecdotal evidence
indicates that the number of abandoned birds has grown
rapidly in the last decade (S. Erden, personal communi-
cation, March 2000).
Where booms are based on species for which the captive
gene pool is narrow, there may be additional problems. For
example, Russel Slade writes (R. Slade, personal communi-
cation March 2000): ‘the BW (bronze wing) parrot has a
dangerously low captive gene pool (12 or less distinct geno-
types) yet the price has fallen from over US$ 800 to less than
US$ 400 in some areas . . . the result is stunted birds, higher
clutch mortality rates, etc.’
Simulation results from AviMod also suggest that the
information on which producers act is important. Timely
understanding of oversupply and price decline produces
greater market stability than operation based on outdated
price information. Correct anticipation of price decline may
reduce over-investment and make price decline more gradual
and less ruinous to producers.
Although these conclusions are tentative, they have policy
implications. In general, they suggest that it may be more
accurate to view the high prices of some CITES-protected
species as offering a possible market windfall, but not
sustained high profitability. Prices may be high now, but they
are likely to drop rapidly once export bans are replaced by
export controls. Market-savvy producers who get into the
market for a valued species early may make good profits,
especially if they know when to pull out of the market, or at
least when to change species. Marginal producers who lack the
resources to invest in market research are likely to confront
flooded markets when they come into full production.
Third, and lastly, they point to the importance of the
information on which producers act. Markets are unstable
because producers are drawn in with false hope of easy
profits. If expectations were more realistic, markets would be
more stable. By extension, documenting and publicizing the
history of boom and bust in aviculture should reduce the
avicultural industry’s potential for build up of surplus popu-
lations of captive-reared birds.
In sum, any attempt to promote aviculture as a
supplement to rural income must pay attention to the
dynamics of bird markets. Failure to do so is likely to be
economically costly to producers and lead to overpopulation
of captive birds, thus increasing the potential for inhumane
treatment of animals and for introduction of non-native
species into the environment.
Conservation implications
New markets with low barriers to entry are notorious for
boom and bust dynamics. In theory, and in observation, the
rush into new production niches commonly leads to product
surplusses, vicious price competition, and market ‘shake-out’
that narrows down the field to the most efficient producers
and allows producers to expand to sizes that provide good
economies of scale. In economic theory, this is well and good.
Low prices are also useful from a conservation perspective, as
they make it uneconomical to take birds from the wild or
smuggle them across international borders.
However, there are several reasons why special consider-
ation is appropriate when the surplus product is live animals.
First, scaling up production from a small number of breeding
birds is likely to involve inbreeding, and the resulting bird
stocks are likely to be unhealthy. This problem was noted
above in the case of Pionus species. Avian veterinarians also
note widespread problem in strains derived from rare varieties
prized as colour mutations (for example lutino strains; Wilson
1998). Competition among those holding rare breeding stock
reduces opportunities for cooperative exchange, as, for
example, is practised among zoological gardens.
Second, the presence of large stocks of surplus, non-native
bird species increases the risk of accidental introductions. If I
hold a large supply of expensive birds, it behoves me to invest
in keeping them secure. If the price suddenly falls, and I find
myself with an unmarketable commodity, I face a hard
decision between destroying birds, holding them at a loss, or
selling at a loss and further depressing prices. Under these
circumstances, an accidental (and perhaps tax deductible)
escape could seem like a blessing. Likewise, low shop prices
encourage people to purchase a cute baby birds and to dispose
of them when they grow up to be noisy, messy, demanding,
and expensive, or when they bite one too many times. As the
number of escaped birds increases, so does the probability of
paired escapees founding a viable feral population.
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Appendix 1: formal model documentation
Conventions
➪ Rate of Flow dt time increment
❒ State Variable INIT initial value
t time (x,y) paired (x,y) values in table look-up
Equations
❒ BreedingBIRDS(t)  BreedingBIRDS(t  dt)  (Maturation  Pets2Breeding  BreederDeaths  Breeders2Pets 
Ageing) * dt
INIT BreedingBIRDS  DesiredBirds/10
➪ Maturation  JuvBreeder/Time2Mature
➪ Pets2Breeding  MaturePets*PricePull
➪ BreederDeaths  BreedingBIRDS*Mortality
➪ Breeders2Pets  BreedingBIRDS*PricePush
➪ Ageing  BreedingBIRDS/FertileLifeSpan
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❒ JuvBreeder(t)  JuvBreeder(t  dt)  (EggsLayed  Maturation  PetChickSales  JuvBreederDeath) * dt
INIT JuvBreeder  BreedingBIRDS*ClutchSize/3
➪ EggsLayed  SMTH3(PriceMultBreeding*BreedingBIRDS/2*ClutchSize,0.5)
➪ Maturation  JuvBreeder/Time2Mature
➪ PetChickSales  JuvBreeder*JuvFractionSold
➪ JuvBreederDeath  JuvBreeder*JuvMort
❒ JuvPets(t)  JuvPets(t  dt)  (PetChickSales  PetMaturation  JuvPetDeath) * dt
INIT JuvPets  0
➪ PetChickSales  JuvBreeder*JuvFractionSold
➪ PetMaturation  JuvPets/Time2Mature
➪ JuvPetDeath  JuvPets*JuvMort
❒ MaturePets(t)  MaturePets(t  dt)  (PetMaturation  Breeders2Pets  PetAgeing  MaturePetDeaths 
Pets2Breeding) * dt
INIT MaturePets  0
➪ PetMaturation  JuvPets/Time2Mature
➪ Breeders2Pets  BreedingBIRDS*PricePush
➪ PetAgeing  MaturePets/FertileLifeSpan
➪ MaturePetDeaths  MaturePets*Mortality
➪ Pets2Breeding  MaturePets*PricePull
❒ OldBIRDS(t)  OldBIRDS(t  dt)  (PetAgeing  Ageing  OldDeaths) * dt
INIT OldBIRDS  0
➪ PetAgeing  MaturePets/FertileLifeSpan
➪ Ageing  BreedingBIRDS/FertileLifeSpan
➪ OldDeaths  OldBIRDS*Mortality*AgeMultDeath
AgeMultDeath  3











(0.00, 1.00), (0.5, 0.98), (1.00, 0.815), (1.50, 0.6), (2.00, 0.5), (2.50, 0.445), (3.00, 0.39), (3.50, 0.345), (4.00, 0.305), (4.50,
0.275), (5.00, 0.255)
Price  GRAPH(( JuvBreederPets)/DesiredBirds)
(0.00, 50.0), (0.167, 10.0), (0.333, 5.00), (0.5, 3.15), (0.667, 2.00), (0.833, 1.40), (1, 1.00), (1.17, 0.8), (1.33, 0.65), (1.50, 0.6),
(1.67, 0.5), (1.83, 0.3), (2.00, 0.2)
PriceMultBreeding  GRAPH(Price)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.25, 0.035), (0.5, 0.07), (0.75, 0.165), (1.00, 0.32), (1.25, 0.56), (1.50, 0.705), (1.75, 0.78), (2.00, 0.83), (2.25,
0.86), (2.50, 0.885), (2.75, 0.91), (3.00, 0.92), (3.25, 0.935), (3.50, 0.94), (3.75, 0.945), (4.00, 0.955), (4.25, 0.96), (4.50, 0.96),
(4.75, 0.96), (5.00, 0.96)
PricePull  GRAPH(Price)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.417, 0.00), (0.833, 0.002), (1.25, 0.005), (1.67, 0.0085), (2.08, 0.0145), (2.50, 0.023), (2.92, 0.0355), (3.33,
0.0515), (3.75, 0.074), (4.17, 0.094), (4.58, 0.099), (5.00, 0.0995)
PricePush  GRAPH(Price)
(0.00, 0.6), (0.5, 0.315), (1.00, 0.09), (1.50, 0.0475), (2.00, 0.034), (2.50, 0.025), (3.00, 0.0155), (3.50, 0.01), (4.00, 0.0075),
(4.50, 0.0065), (5.00, 0.0055)
